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SHORT ARTICLE
A spatial analysis of the Brexit vote in the West
Midlands
David Hearne
ABSTRACT
Recent votes for populist parties and policies have been a focus for an increasingly significant body of
academic research. In the UK this has particularly focused research on the drivers of the vote to leave the
European Union (Brexit) in 2016. In spite of a growing body of work on the subject, the literature
investigating the applicability of spatial econometric methods is surprisingly thin. This paper applies such
methods to hitherto unused data for the West Midlands region, where we have an unusually rich set of
small-area results. The work finds substantial spatial autocorrelation even after demographic differences
are accounted for. Whilst focusing on a particular region, the rise of populism globally gives these
findings a wider salience.
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INTRODUCTION
In June 2016, a majority of voters in the UK voted to leave the European Union (EU). The result
was a shock to most in the UK – where a substantial majority of voters had expected a ‘Remain’
victory (Ashcroft, 2016). This result will have a substantial economic impact on the UK and
across Europe, particularly in certain sectors, countries and regions (Chen et al., 2018; Lawless
&Morgenroth, 2019), with the overwhelming preponderance of academic work suggesting a sig-
nificant deleterious effect on the UK economy (Dhingra et al., 2016a, 2016b). The ramifications
for domestic politics and governance will meanwhile be profound (Gamble, 2018).
However, the vote of 2016 has a wider significance when viewed within the prism of electoral
movements that have been broadly labelled as populist (Essletzbichler et al., 2018; Goodwin,
2018; Kriesi & Pappas, 2015; Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2017). As a result, academics and others
have taken a keen interest in the potential drivers of the vote in the UK, both in its own right
and as a case of a more general phenomenon.
Many of the factors that appear to have been important in the 2016 vote in the UK are mir-
rored across the EU, with votes for populist and anti-EU parties driven in part by geographical
factors (Dijkstra et al., 2020). More widely, evidence suggests that this is a global phenomenon as
witnessed in the United States with the election of President Donald Trump and elsewhere
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(Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Intriguingly, some analyses of Brexit find systematic similarities with
the regional distribution of votes for the Front Nationale in France (Becker et al., 2017).
Are these spatial patterns solely the result of demographic factors? Using a spatial error model
and highly localized data in the West Midlands, this paper finds that even after accounting for
demographic differences, clear spatial patterns remain in the 2016 vote in that region. It then
discusses some of the potential drivers of these patterns and hypothesize that a ‘geography of dis-
content’ (Los et al., 2017) could also be visible at extremely local levels. Finally, avenues for future
research are considered, arguing that local spatial variation should be investigated further in an
international context.
LITERATURE REVIEW
There is now a substantial literature on the 2016 referendum. Much of this makes use of aggre-
gate data, which became available earlier than most widely used survey evidence. The earliest
work analysing the drivers of the vote came as part of the political science literature, most notably
looking at groups that might be labelled ‘left behind’ by globalization (Goodwin &Heath, 2016).
There is evidence that austerity contributed to the ‘Leave’ vote (Fetzer, 2019): the burden of gov-
ernment fiscal retrenchment fell disproportionately on poorer areas (Gray & Barford, 2018;
Hastings et al., 2017).
Such arguments fit with the hypothesis that it is precisely the fact that certain regions ‘don’t
matter’ that has fuelled recent ‘populist’ voting patterns (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018). Given evidence
that ‘individuals with very similar characteristics vote differently in Leave- and Remain-voting
areas’ (Abreu & Öner, 2019, p. 2), studying and understanding the spatial distribution of the
vote is important. It is this insight that motivates the current paper.
It has long been acknowledged that voting decisions exhibit a distinct spatial pattern. This is
true in the United States, amongst others – where certain states and counties can be reliably
counted on to vote more intensively for a particular candidate or party than others. Crucially,
these are typically clustered, with evidence that this effect has grown stronger over time (Kim
et al., 2003). More broadly, it is possible to use this information to improve statistical prediction
of electoral outcomes (Wing & Walker, 2010), although such prediction remains necessarily
imperfect. The same is true in the UK and elsewhere in Europe. There is substantial prima
facie evidence of spatial clustering in the referendum results with a Moran’s I of 0.627,1 which
is statistically significantly different from 0 (the null hypothesis is rejected with a probability
of > 99.9%). With regard to the 2016 EU referendum in particular, very little econometric
work has explicitly taken into account the spatial pattern of results, although many have used
‘multilevel’models allowing for differing regional intercepts.2 Beecham et al. (2018) are a notable
exception to this in positing an explicit spatial model that allows for all model parameters to vary
by region. Becker et al. (2017), in contrast, offer one of the most comprehensive overviews of
demographic factors and the vote, using a best subset selection model selection procedure but
do not using any spatial modelling techniques. The key findings are consistent across papers –
education and age are strong predictors of how an area voted, with the young and degree educated
being much more likely to vote to remain part of the EU.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
It is this literature that motivates the current paper. In particular, the following research questions
present themselves. First, to what extent are the findings of the literature applicable at different
spatial scales (specifically at the local level)? Second, and arguably more importantly, is there local
spatial dependence and what are the implications of this?
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This paper therefore contributes to the above literature by investigating the spatial distri-
bution of the vote to leave the EU at a local level. An explicit spatial model is posited and has
considerably better predictive power than its non-spatial counterparts. Such a spatial model is
a significant improvement on traditional non-spatial approaches for several key reasons. First,
as is well known, spatial dependence violates the Gauss–Markov conditions.3
However, a finding of spatial dependence after controlling for other factors suggests some dee-
per issues at play. In particular, it raises the intriguing possibility that the process might be inher-
ently spatial in the sense that – after controlling for differences in their demographic characteristics
– certain locations are more likely to vote in favour of Brexit than others.4 If applicable to the local
level data used in this paper, this would imply that some form of ‘neighbourhood effect’ is likely to
be at play. The implications of this are explored further in the ‘discussion’ section below.
Whilst the motivation is clear, the primary limiting factor is the availability of data. Official
results were published at the local authority (district) level for Great Britain5 (Electoral Commis-
sion, 2016), which have been widely used in the literature. However, whereas most councils have
not made data available for smaller spatial units than local authority districts, a small number have
voluntarily done so.
The West Midlands is unusual (and privileged) in having several adjacent councils choose to
make such data available at the ‘ward’ level.6 These are the most granular electoral units in the
UK, typically comprising a few thousand people, although several in Birmingham have a popu-
lation in excess of 30,000. Results by ward are available in seven contiguous local authority dis-
tricts, which comprise 161 wards and a total of well in excess of 1 million voters. It is this data
availability that primarily drives our choice of area.
Figure 1 illustrates these local authorities and outlines the wards within them. The most egre-
gious omission is that of Sandwell (the ‘hole’ in the centre of the map). Sandwell as a whole voted
to leave the EU by 66.72% to 33.28%, making it very similar to adjoining local authorities.
Unfortunately, votes for Sandwell were counted together, which has meant that the council
were unable to provide any further breakdown.
Naturally, this is unfortunate since wards that border Sandwell are treated as having no neigh-
bours on that side, which is clearly false. In fact, this is a broader issue since the same problem
arises around the exterior border of the region as well. These areas have similar demographic pro-
files to bordering wards, although this is of only modest comfort since what is relevant to our
analysis is the error after controlling for these factors. The upshot of this is that the results should
Figure 1. Ward level data availability in the West Midlands.
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be treated with some care and this is an inevitable limitation, although the robustness to different
weighting criteria and the demographic profile of neighbouring wards gives some confidence in
the overall results.
The percentage of total voters who voted Leave in the EU referendum is modelled using a
spatial-autoregressive model with spatially correlated errors (Anselin, 1988). The model takes
the well-known form:
y = rWy+ Xb+ u (1)
u = lWu+ 1 (2)
where y represents a vector of results; X is a k × n matrix of independent variables; β is a vector of
parameter estimates; and u is an error term. W is a matrix of weights; and ε is a vector of i.i.d.
Normal error terms. Estimation is via maximum likelihood. This approach encompasses quite
a wide range of models, allowing relatively complex spatial effects whilst maintaining effective
use of the entire data set.
On an econometric level, it does have two disadvantages. First, it assumes linearity in (1) even
though the dependent variable is bounded. Second, it imposesNormality on the error term.The for-
mer calls for care in interpretation, although it should provide a locally accurate linear approximation
(in essence it is likely to prove poor in wards where predictors are far from their average values).
Naturally, there are a variety of potential weighting strategies forW. Euclidean distance is an
attractive criteria, but there are also numerous options in terms of assigning particular weights to
neighbours. Whilst it is theoretically possible to use two different weighting matrices in (1) and
(2), there is no obvious theoretical reason to do so. In practice, predictive accuracy was highest
when contiguity was used as a criteria and weights were row-standardized.7 Results using a var-
iety of weighting criteria – including inverse (Euclidian) distance, unstandardized contiguity and
the square of inverse distance – were similar with only minor differences in coefficient estimates.8
The only concern here is that wards on the exterior of our data set effectively ‘double weight’ their
neighbours since they behave as if there were no neighbours on the other side, which is false. This
is an argument in favour of using unstandardized contiguity as a criterion, although doing so
makes no significant difference to the overall findings of the research.
Whilst the choice of weighting matrix was ultimately an empirical decision, there are weak
grounds to prefer contiguity to distance. Specifically, in our data set travel time (and also the probable
intensity of socialmixing) is likely tobebetter representedby contiguity thandistance. Sparsely popu-
lated wards might be a significant distance apart but will enjoy low travel times due to high vehicle
speeds. In contrast, travel speed (irrespective of transport mode) is much lower in the densely popu-
lated towns and cities. Similarly, if there is voter clustering, this is likely to straddle ward boundaries.
A range of sociodemographic variables are included in the model, simultaneously controlling for
demographic differences across wards and enabling us to investigate several important hypotheses.
These variables have been selected due to their availability at ward level, but also in an attempt to
build on previous work. Given evidence that white Britons voted more strongly to leave the EU
than their ethnicminority counterparts (Alabrese et al., 2019), the ‘white British’ variable is included.
Younger people and those with a degree were much less likely to vote Leave than other groups
(Ashcroft, 2016), leading to the inclusion of variables on education level and the 65+ age cat-
egory. The hypothesis of certain areas being ‘left behind’ is explored at a very local level via
the proportion of the workforce engaged in manufacturing and median property prices, alongside
a proxy for social class. Car ownership and commute length are broad measures of how ‘urban’ a
community is. Migration was a key campaign issue during the referendum and so the proportion
of the population from EU states is included as an independent variable.
Data on all independent variables are sourced from the 2011 Census, apart from median
property prices, which are published independently by the Office for National Statistics
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(ONS). In many regards, using highly localized data represents an improvement relative to using
the official results for local authority districts due to the much greater level of inter-ward variation
in both voter preferences and sociodemographic indicators. For example, there is a great deal of
inter-ward variation in the proportion of ethnic minorities by ward, ranging from under 1.5% in
Rawnsley to 89.3% in Lozells and East Handsworth.
DATA AND EMPIRICS
As can be seen from Figure 2, although all seven local authorities voted to leave the EU overall,
many wards voted strongly to remain and this variation is not randomly distributed over space
(wards voted similarly to their neighbours).
As can be imagined, a Moran’s I statistic of 0.704 gives statistically significant evidence (p >
0.999) of spatial autocorrelation. This persists even after controlling for sociodemographic
characteristics as the results below demonstrate. Note that all variables are standardized (Table 1).
Note that predictive ability (represented by Akaike information criterion – AIC) improves
substantially when a spatial error term is included and in all cases lambda is highly significant.
The residuals from models (1) and (2) are spatially correlated (Moran’s I being equal to 0.228
and 0.246, respectively, and highly significant in both cases). The Moran scatter plot (Figure
3) makes this point quite starkly. Ultimately, one can conclude that, within the West Midlands
at least, even highly localized referendum results show significant spatial patterns after controlling
for differences in demographics.
Testing for statistical adequacy
Statistical testing is an important part of any modelling procedure. Although a Shapiro–Wilks
test for normality in the error term rejects the null, a Q-Q plot (Figure 4) shows that this is largely
driven by a single outlying ward.
Figure 2. The leave vote in the West Midlands.
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Removal of that individual ward –Hagley – gives a Shapiro–Wilk value of 0.992, which is not
significant at any conventional significant level (p > 0.5). The density plot (Figure 5) indicates the
importance of this one observation, with a residual of almost –10.
DISCUSSION
These results require considerable care in interpretation. The spatial error model (4) offers the
best predictive performance and is to be preferred, minimizing AIC. This is consistent with
the fact that the rho coefficient in the SARAR model (5) is not statistically significantly different
from zero. In most cases, coefficient estimates are similar (but not identical) between using OLS
and the model including a spatial error term.
Table 1. Results.
Variable
(standard error)
OLS full
model (1)
OLS model
(2)
Spatial error
model (3)
Spatial error
model (4)
SARAR
model (5)
Intercept 61.2611***
(0.2069)
61.2611***
(0.2105)
61.1763***
(0.4155)
61.1889***
(0.4161)
63.2861***
(3.2034)
% of White British
residents
5.3875***
(0.5433)
5.4897***
(0.4303)
6.35733***
(0.5350)
6.1876***
(0.3749)
6.2997***
(0.4076)
% of Students −1.5295***
(0.5025)
−1.6043***
(0.3142)
−1.5026***
(0.4596)
−1.8047***
(0.2745)
−1.8120***
(0.2738)
Median property
price
−0.9610*
(0.5117)
−0.7549
(0.4657)
−0.8169
(0.5126)
−0.9952**
(0.4871)
−1.0317**
(0.4912)
% with Degree-level
qualifications
−5.2932***
(0.9479)
−5.4441***
(0.4744)
−5.0475***
(0.8516)
−5.6123***
(0.4591)
−5.5982***
(0.4594)
% Working in
manufacturing
2.9436***
(0.4432)
2.8394***
(0.3809)
2.3574***
(0.4829)
2.6131***
(0.4391)
2.7306***
(0.4799)
% with Few
qualifications
1.2243
(1.3503)
−0.18450
(1.1803)
% over 65 0.7393**
(0.3652)
0.9123***
(0.3225)
0.5577*
(0.3311)
0.5255*
(0.3037)
0.5207*
(0.3030)
% of Households
with no car
−1.3844**
(0.7000)
−1.3206***
(0.5014)
−1.3583**
(0.6539)
−1.0783**
(0.4502)
−1.1065**
(0.4520)
% in ABC1 social
groups
1.3169
(1.4668)
−1.2107
(1.3389)
% with Commute
under 10 km
0.4461
(0.3283)
0.5234*
(0.3081)
0.2053
(0.3784)
% of Residents from
the EU
−1.2019
(0.8506)
−1.2158
(0.8453)
−0.6422
(0.8428)
% of Residents from
post-2004 accession
states
2.5794***
(0.6019)
2.4979***
(0.5744)
1.8344***
(0.6041)
1.3940***
(0.3271)
1.3915***
(0.3268)
Lambda 0.5746
(0.0810)
0.5731
(0.0811)
0.5922***
(0.08487)
Rho −0.0343
(0.0520)
Akaike information
criterion (AIC)
782.18 779.31 759.20 752.93 754.5
Notes: Model selection was undertaken by minimizing the AIC. R2 is not reported, but is > 0.95 for the two
ordinary least squares (OLS) models.
***Significant at 1%; **significant at 5%; *significant at 10%.
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The coefficients on degree-level education fit with similar conclusions from previous research
(Becker et al., 2017), namely that the presence of degree-holders is strongly correlated to a higher
‘remain’ vote, although this appears to be due, in part, to neighbourhood composition and self-
selection (Abreu &Öner, 2019). It is also clear that the size of the migrant population from post-
2004 accession states is a factor. The larger the size of this population, ceteris paribus, the greater
the percentage of the ward’s population that voted ‘leave’. This fits with broader arguments over
the role of immigration in the vote (Goodwin & Milazzo, 2017), although extreme caution is
warranted in interpreting this finding.
A causal relationship should not necessarily be inferred from this and it is not clear whether it
is migration per se that had an impact or the perception of excess pressure on local services due to
Figure 3. Moran plot of residuals from model 2.
Figure 4. Normal Q-Q plot of residuals from model 4.
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an increase in population at the same time as austerity cut public spending in real terms. This also
raises interesting questions for future research: are the spatial patterns of migration different to
previous waves and are there qualitative differences between migrants living in Remain voting
areas to those living in Leave voting areas?
Two further questions present themselves. First, why does the proportion of manufacturing
employment have such predictive power? Second, what underlying factors are causing the pres-
ence of spatial dependence, after controlling for sociodemographic factors? It is, of course,
impossible to fully answer either question fully with the current data – it is likely that detailed
survey and interview information will be needed in order to understand this. However, local man-
ufacturing employment is frequently used as a proxy for a ‘blue collar’ workforce and economic
decline.9 When combined with the sociodemographic profile of extremely ‘pro-Brexit’ wards
(notably a large white British population and relatively few degree holders), this lends further
support to the hypothesis that the Leave vote was in part driven by territorial inequalities (Rodrí-
guez-Pose, 2018) and suggests that this was true at a very local level. Deindustrialization and
economic decline are hallmarks of areas that have been ‘left behind’, perhaps explaining why
wards where many work in manufacturing voted leave.
Insofar as such ‘relative decline’ is itself spatially correlated but is not fully captured by socio-
demographic variables, this could also drive spatial dependence within the model. This would be
akin to a ‘missing variable’ problem – where the missing variable is both spatially correlated and
(obviously) correlated with the model residuals. This might also be a factor driving some of the
neighbourhood effects identified by Abreu and Öner (2019), fitting nicely with the growing body
of evidence around the challenges of ‘ecological inference’ (King et al., 2004). If correct, this
suggests that policymakers seeking to address the grievances of ‘left behind’ communities also
need to focus on policies that empower communities and facilitate economic development at a
highly local level as well as a regional one. This is likely to be true more generally in countries
and regions where populist political movements are on the rise. Future work will undoubtedly
want to assess the applicability of the SARAR model to regional voting patterns across Europe.
Other factors appear to be more place-specific. Ethnic composition, for example, appears to have
Figure 5. Density plot of residuals from model 4.
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an unusually strong effect in the West Midlands: wards with a large ethnic minority population
tended to vote more strongly to ‘remain’ than others.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has demonstrated that, even after controlling for demographic factors, spatial auto-
correlation in the residual vote pattern remains, suggesting that demographics alone cannot
account for the 2016 vote to Leave the EU in theWest Midlands. These results confirm the find-
ings of Beecham et al. (2018), suggesting failure to account for spatial autocorrelation leads to
misleading predictions, implying that on a highly localized level, spatial factors were significant
in the Brexit vote. These results are limited to ‘prediction’ and need to be interpreted with cau-
tion, both due to the ecological inference fallacy (Robinson, 1950) and the modifiable areal unit
problem (Fotheringham & Wong, 1991).
The findings are of academic interest, adding further nuance to our understanding of the vote
in 2016, particularly at a very local level. Although the findings relate to local communities in the
West Midlands, the work sits in a broader empirical context. In particular, it suggests an avenue
for future research: there is a clear rationale for conducting further work to understand the rise in
populism across Europe that focuses on very local communities. More generally, it suggests an
expanded research agenda considering local intra-regional inequalities.
This points to the wider significance of some of the findings. In particular, these results
suggest a clear need for electoral research to do two things. First, it is necessary to explicit account
for the implications of spatial dependence when modelling. Second, whilst the current work reaf-
firms the importance of the ‘places that don’t matter’ (Rodríguez-Pose, 2018) and the ‘geography
of discontent’ (Los et al., 2017) in broad analytical terms, these results suggest that the spatial
scale at which this phenomenon manifests is likely to be extremely local.
The paper, therefore, has argued that future analysis of populist movements internationally
should take this into account rather than categorizing entire regions in this way. In the US
case, for example, counties vary wildly in size, but many are extremely large, although in many
cases results (and other statistics) are available much more locally. Similarly, for policy-makers,
this research adds to the growing body of evidence that spatial factors clearly matter when asses-
sing the dynamics of populism and, moreover, suggests that this is true at more granular level
than was hitherto realised. Policies to address this must make a difference at a highly localized
level as well as at a regional and meso-scale.
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NOTES
1 A widely used measure of how closely results are correlated across space. A larger and statisti-
cally significant value of Moran’s I suggests that regions that are proximate are more likely to vote
similarly than those that are more distant.
2 Such models allow for the ‘average’ vote do differ between regions and nations (Scotland par-
ticularly stands out for its above-average ‘remain’ vote, for example). However, they continue to
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assume that the impact of education is constant across regions (such that the gap between degree-
and high-school-educated individuals is identical in every region).
3 For a fuller discussion, see, for example, LeSage and Pace (2009). As a result, estimation that
does not take account of this dependence (e.g., OLS) is likely to be inefficient, meaning that coef-
ficient estimates are likely to be less accurate than they would be were an explicit spatial model to
be estimated.
4 At a much larger spatial scale, locational differences exist with Scotland, parts of northern
Wales (especially Gwynedd) and certain local authorities around Liverpool being much more
likely to vote ‘Remain’ than other areas with equivalent sociodemographic characteristics. Inter-
estingly, in each case local media consumption patterns differ substantially from the norm in the
rest of the UK. This is not the case in the West Midlands.
5 Results for Northern Ireland and Gibraltar were given in totem, although there exists some
breakdown for the former. Ultimately, Northern Ireland is an interesting case deserving treat-
ment in its own right.
6 These were the UK’s lower Local Authority Units (LAU-2, formerly NUTS-5 regions) as
applied in 2016, per the then nomenclature of Eurostat (2019).
7 In practical terms, this meant that weights for each ward summed to 1 (a ward with two neigh-
bours would assign a weight of 0.5 to each, whereas one with four neighbours would assign a
weight of 0.25 to each).
8 The only (minor) exception to this relates to the inclusion of the variable on the percentage of
residents from elsewhere in the EU. Where inverse distance is used as a weighting matrix, the
inclusion of this variable yields a very slightly lower Akaike information criterion (AIC) than
when it is excluded, although it is not statistically significant (even at the 10% level). In contrast,
our preferred model delivers a similarly slight reduction in the AIC by excluding said variable.
Ultimately, the differences are marginal, and, in any case, a more parsimonious model is generally
to be preferred.
9 Manufacturing employment in the UK has contracted rapidly over time, particularly in the
West Midlands.
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